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Executive summary 
 
Every year disasters kill around 75000 people and affect 200 million people. The design and 
operation of a humanitarian relief chain play a significant role in achieving an effective and 
efficient immediate response. Kovacs and Spens (2007) propose a framework which draws 
parallels between issues in humanitarian logistics and business logistics. Three phases of the 
disaster relief operations can be distinguished, (1) the preparation phase, (2) immediate 
response phase and (3) the reconstruction phase. For each actor and phase, parallels to 
business logistics can be identified. Kovacs and Spens (2007) state that risk management will 
help regional actors in the phase of preparing for disaster and that further research is 
necessary to examine this link and identify the specific implications for humanitarian 
logistics. As an extension of the study of Kovacs and Spens (2007), this research aims to 
examine the parallels between commercial and humanitarian relief chains from the regional 
perspective in the preparation phase. This study will propose implications from supply chain 
risk management for the preparation of disaster relief operations from the regional 
perspective. With these implications the study intends to provide guidelines for a more 
effective preparation of disaster relief operations from the regional perspective. 
 
Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) designed a comprehensive framework for systematically 
exploring the concept of risk management in commercial supply chains. It describes the basic 
constructs of the supply chain risk management with three risk sources, risk consequences, 
five risk drivers, and four strategies to mitigate risks for supply chains. Risk sources are 
environmental, organisational or supply chain-related variables which cannot be predicted 
with certainty and which have impact on the supply chain outcome variables. Risk 
consequences are the supply chain outcome variables like e.g. costs or quality, i.e. the 
different forms in which the variance becomes manifest. Risk drivers are the ‘calculated risks’ 
from the companies in order to improve competitiveness, reduce costs, and increase or 
maintain profitability, which can expose the companies to more risks. To mitigate risks for 
business supply chains, Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) propose four strategies, (1) 
avoidance, (2) control, (3) cooperation, and (4) flexibility.  
 
A literature review revealed that the basic constructs of the framework of Juttner, Peck and 
Christopher (2005) were also recognised in studies about humanitarian relief operations. In 
addition to the literature review primary field data was gathered in order to explore the 
 3 
implications from supply chain risk management for the preparation of disaster relief 
operations and gain insight in possible parallels between risk management and the preparation 
phase of humanitarian relief operations from the regional perspective. The qualitative case 
studies provided an in-depth perspective. Two case studies were undertaken, each of which 
uses a combination of expert-interviews and written material. The first case explores the 
regional humanitarian relief organisation of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. There is the 
local commander of the affected island in charge of the local hurricane relief. The hurricane 
relief is supported by the Dutch Military. The second case was undertaken in the Caribbean 
Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDEMA), which is a regional inter-governmental 
agency serving the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and is responsible for disaster relief 
management. 
 
The results of the case studies show that the risk sources, which are described in the literature, 
have parallels with the regional humanitarian organisations from the case studies. The risk 
consequences of the regional humanitarian organisations are similar for all humanitarian 
organisations and without adequate and timely delivery of supplies, the risk can have 
consequences for health and lives. Most of the risk drivers from the business logistics are also 
found in the humanitarian literature. However, when we look at the case study material, only 
the globalisation trend was identified by the regional organisations. The four strategies to 
mitigate risks are all found in the case studies. Although the humanitarian relief chain is 
different from the business supply chain in some ways, the framework of risk management 
proposed by Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) for the business logistics can be transferred 
to humanitarian relief organisations including the regional organisations. 
 
The managerial implications of the study lie in the observation that although the regional 
actors which have been studied for this research already used most of the risk management 
strategies, other regional humanitarian organisations might improve their organisation to 
apply the risk management strategies from the business logistics which have been proposed 
by Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003). With the strategies avoidance, control, cooperation, 
and flexibility, the regional actors can achieve a more effective preparation of disaster relief 
operations and gain a more resilient organisation. 
  
Several limitations of this study are noted. First, the regional actors from the case studies were 
both situated in a relatively small geographical area, which does not create a complex 
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environment. Other regional actors may have larger operating areas and a more complex 
environment. Second, the Caribbean is also known for the hurricanes which torture the region, 
which pushes the local community to remain alert. In regions which are less prone to natural 
disasters and have a more complex environment than the Caribbean, risk management might 
help the regional actors in the phase of preparing for natural disasters. Third, the case studies 
were limited to face-to-face and telephone interviews with 2 and 3 experts per case study. 
More experts could have given a better insight. Fourth, the research only studied if the basic 
constructs were present within the regional organisations. It did not research to what extent 
the basic constructs were implemented in the organisations. To study this, a more in-depth 
research is required. To create a better insight in the risk management in regional 
humanitarian organisations, further research is required. Further research should study more 
regional humanitarian organisations which are more geographical separated. With a more in-
depth study of the organisations, the level of implementation of the basic constructs can better 
be explored.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruption etc. are more and more on 
the news. Every year there are about 500 disasters killing around 75000 people and affecting 
some 200 million people (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Predictions suggest the number of natural 
and human-made disasters will increase five-fold in the next 50 years (Thomas and Kopczak, 
2005). The objective of disaster response is to rapidly provide relief (emergency food, water, 
medicine, shelter, and supplies) to areas affected by large-scale emergencies, so as to 
minimize human suffering and death (Beamon and Balcik, 2008). A disaster can be natural or 
man-made. Natural disasters comprise both ‘slow onset’ disasters such as famine and drought 
and ‘sudden onset’ such as tsunami’s, hurricanes or earthquakes (See figure 1: Explaining 
disasters). Man-made disasters also have ‘slow-onset’ disasters, such as a political crisis and a 
refugee crisis, and ‘sudden-onset’ disasters, for example a terrorist attack or a chemical leak. 
This research will concentrate on the natural, sudden-onset disasters. 
 
 Natural Man-made 
Sudden-onset Earthquakes 
Hurricane 
Tornadoes 
Terrorist Attack 
Coup d’Etat 
Chemical Leak 
Slow-onset Famine 
Drought 
Poverty 
Political Crisis 
Refugee Crisis 
Figure 1: Explaining disasters (Van Wassenhove, 2006) 
 
The nature of most disasters demands an immediate response, hence supply chains need to be 
designed and deployed at once even though the knowledge of the situation is very limited 
(Beamon, 2004). The design and operation of a humanitarian relief chain plays a significant 
role in achieving an effective and efficient immediate response. Humanitarian logistics plays 
an important role in this relief chain and encompasses a range of activities, including 
procurement, transport, tracking and tracing, customs clearance, local transportation, 
warehousing, and last mile delivery. Although logistics is central to disaster response 
activities, for years, the aid sector’s regard for logistics has been viewed as a necessary 
expense rather than an important strategic component of their work (Beamon and Kotleba, 
2006). Until fairly recently humanitarian logistics was a back-office function that was not 
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given the proper attention and logistics skill remained underdeveloped (Van Wassenhove, 
2006). Since disaster relief is about 80% logistics it would follow that the only way to achieve 
a successful relief operation is through smooth, efficient and effective logistics operations and 
more precisely, supply chain management. Academic literature on the humanitarian logistics 
is limited. Most of the literature is not academic but originates in practitioner journals. 
Obviously, there is a need for academic research in the field (Kovacs and Spens, 2007). 
 
While each actor involved in disaster relief logistics will need to take the contextual 
differences of humanitarian logistics to business logistics into account, from the difficulties to 
predict demand to coordinate supply, the tools and methods they need in disaster relief can be 
adapted from business logistics (Kovacs and Spens, 2007). If we define commercial 
(business) logistics as the process of managing the flow of goods, information and finances 
from the source to the final customers, humanitarian logistics can be quite easily defined 
similarly. Humanitarian logistics also requires a process for managing the flow of goods, 
information and finances from donors to affected persons (Ernst, 2003 cited by Kovacs and 
Spens, 2007). Humanitarian logistics, as well as business logistics, encompasses a range of 
activities including preparedness, planning, procurement, transport, warehousing, tracking and 
tracing and customs clearances (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). This suggests, therefore, that 
the basic principles of managing the flow of goods, information and finances also remain 
valid for humanitarian logistics.  
 
Kovacs and Spens (2007) proposed a framework that illustrates the links between different 
actors and phases of disaster relief operations. This framework also draws parallels between 
issues in humanitarian logistics, and business logistics. The framework in Figure 2 combines 
the perspectives of different actors involved in delivering humanitarian aid on disaster relief 
operations with three different phases of the operations. The actors involved in disaster relief 
can grouped in two large categories, regional actors, those that exist in the region and are 
intrinsically linked to it, such as host governments, the military, local enterprises and regional 
aid agencies, and extra-regional actors, such as the UN, larger aid agencies, extra-regional 
NGOs, logistics service providers, etc. Three phases of the disaster relief operations can be 
distinguished, (1) the times before a disaster occurs (the preparation phase), (2) instantly after 
a disaster (immediate response phase) and (3) the aftermath of a natural disaster (the 
reconstruction phase). For each actor and phase, parallels to business logistics can be 
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identified. Further research is necessary to examine each of these links and propose their 
specific implications for humanitarian logistics.  
 
Figure 2: framework for disaster relief logistics 
 
While natural disasters are difficult to prevent, some regions are more prone to them than 
others and particularly these high risk regions might be able to prepare for certain specific 
disaster. Also, measures can be taken to limit the impact of disasters. For obvious reasons, 
regional actors, e.g. regional governments, businesses and non-governmental organizations, 
should prepare such plans. However, in practice the emergency preparedness plans 
unfortunately often lack any insight in disaster relief logistics (Chaikin 2003). Logistic 
support is needed in prevention and evacuation-related measures before a disaster strikes 
(which might be foreseen, e.g. when volcanoes are predicted to erupt or hurricanes are 
approaching a region). Risk management will help regional actors in the phase of preparing 
for disaster. Kovacs and Spens (2007) state that further research is necessary to examine each 
of the links and identify their specific implications for humanitarian logistics. 
 
As an extension of the study of Kovacs and Spens (2007), this research is aimed to examine 
the parallels between commercial and humanitarian relief chains from the regional perspective 
in the preparation phase. This study will propose implications from supply chain risk 
management for the preparation of disaster relief operations from the regional perspective. 
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With these implications the study intends to achieve a more effective preparation of disaster 
relief operations from the regional perspective. 
 
The research is based on an extensive literature review, the study of archival data and 
interviews with key-players in disaster relief operations. We explore two case studies of 
regional emergency operations plans. The first case study discusses the emergency operation 
plan of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The second case study is about the disaster 
management organisation Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), 
which holds sixteen participating states in the east side of the Caribbean. The aim of this 
research is to examine the regional perspective in the preparation phase, draw parallels with 
risk management and come to implications. 
 
In this paper I start with examining the literature on business logistics and humanitarian 
logistics, risk management in business logistics and risk management in humanitarian relief 
operations. After this, the methodology is discussed and the results from the case studies are 
reported. This will lead to the discussion. Finally the conclusion is presented with 
implications and limitations.  
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2. Literature review 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Kovacs and Spens (2007) state that the tools and methods, which are needed in disaster relief 
operations, can be adapted from business logistics. Risk management will help regional actors 
in the preparation phase. Each actor in disaster relief logistics will need to take the differences 
between humanitarian logistics and business logistics into account, from the difficulties to 
predict demand to the high stakes involved. This chapter will give a literature review on the 
similarities and differences between commercial and humanitarian relief chains, risk 
management in business logistics and risk management in the humanitarian relief operations. 
 
 
2.2 Similarities and differences between commercial and humanitarian relief chains  
 
A supply chain is a network consisting of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and 
customers. In this network there are three flows; the material flow, the information flow, and 
the financial flow. The material flow represents the physical product flow from the suppliers 
all the way to the customer and the reverse flow from the customer for product returns, 
servicing and recycling. The information flow represents the order transmission and order 
tracking which coordinate the physical flow. The financial flow represents the credit terms, 
payment schedules and consignment arrangements (Kleindorfer and Van Wassenhove, 2004). 
All three flows require careful design and close coordination. 
 
Despite the contextual differences of the private sector and humanitarians, it is supply chain 
management that is at the centre of any given logistical operation (Van Wassenhove, 2006). 
The management task is to identify necessary operations and select their organizational 
location to realize the performance of the supply chain as a whole. Supply chain management 
must organize and manage a potentially worldwide supply and distribution network that 
delivers a variety of products and services in direct to customers needs in global markets 
(Schary and Sjott-Larsen, 2003). 
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The lifecycle of a disaster relief operation starts with a brief needs assessment period, which 
provides the foundation for developing the disaster relief supply chain (Beamon, 2004). After 
the supply chain has been established, supplies move to the region affected by the disaster. If 
operations must be sustained for a longer period of time, the supply chain progressively 
changes and becomes more structured. Finally, disaster relief operations should be reduced, 
such that the organisations either terminate the supply chain or transfer its operations to local 
agencies (Maon et al, 2009). 
 
Several key similarities mark commercial and disaster relief supply chain management, such 
as the basic principles associated with the managing the flows of goods, information, and 
finances. The main supply chain management processes, which are used when structuring and 
analyzing commercial logistics, remain the same in humanitarian relief supply chain 
management (Maon et al, 2009): 
 
- demand management; 
- supply management; and 
- fulfilment management 
 
In humanitarian logistics, the demand management is assessing the demand after a disaster 
strikes. The demand is unpredictable regarding timing, location, and scale (Kovacs and Spens, 
2007). Given the unpredictability of demand and the limited information aid agencies have in 
the first hours and days after a disaster, supplies are ‘pushed’ to the disaster location in a first 
phase. Only in a later stage of the relief operation more accurate data on the needs of disaster 
victims can be assembled, changing push supplies to more pull operations (Long and Wood, 
1995).  
 
Managing the supplies in humanitarian logistics can be complex, due to the many forms of 
supplies. There are loads of donated supplies, which can clog airports and warehouses 
(Murray, 2005). But also the ordered supplies arrive in unmanageable forms. The lack of 
standard labelling of supplies is one of the biggest problems of distributing aid at sites 
(Murray, 2005). 
 
The fulfilment management during humanitarian operations is mostly challenging due to the 
poor infrastructure on site after a disaster. This can be the non-existence of airports and roads, 
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to the availability of vehicles and fuel. Transportation itself is often not the biggest problem. 
The biggest problem is mostly the shortage of materials handling equipment at the receiving 
end (Trunick, 2005).  
 
In conclusion, the basic principles associated with the managing the flows of goods, 
information, and finances are quite similar in humanitarian relief chains as compared to 
commercial supply chain, however, the problems that occur in the management of these 
processes can be quite different. In disaster relief operations, supply chain management has 
unique characteristics related to the particular nature of disasters and the technical 
requirements of disaster relief operations. There are fundamental differences between 
commercial supply chains and humanitarian relief chains in terms of their strategic goals, 
customer and demand characteristics, and environmental factors. The dominating 
characteristics that bring additional complexity and unique challenges to relief chain design 
and management are (Beamon, 2004): 
 
- Demand pattern 
- Lead time 
- Distribution network configuration 
- Inventory control 
- Information system 
- Strategic goals 
- Performance measurement system 
- Demand characteristics 
 
The demand pattern in the commercial supply chain is usually relatively stable, and 
predictable. Demands occur from fixed locations in set quantities. In the humanitarian relief 
chain the demand is generated from random events that are unpredictable in terms of timing, 
location, type, and size (Van Wassenhove, 2006). The demand requirements are estimated 
after they are needed, based on an assessment of the disaster.  
 
The lead time of a commercial supply chain is determined by the chain of supplier, 
manufacturer, DC, and retailer. The requested lead times of the humanitarian relief chain is 
approximately zero, because there’s zero time between the occurrence of the demand and the 
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need for the demand, but the actual lead time is still determined by the chain of material flow 
(Beamon and Balcik, 2008).  
 
The distribution network configuration has well-defined methods for determining the number 
and location of distribution centres for the commercial supply chain. Due to the nature of the 
unknown, such as the location, type and size of events, politics, and culture, and ‘last mile’ 
considerations, the distribution network configuration for the humanitarian relief chain is 
quite a challenge (Beamon, 2004, Beamon and Balcik, 2008).  
 
The commercial supply chain utilizes well-defined methods for determining inventory levels 
based on lead time, demand and target customer service levels. The inventory control of the 
humanitarian relief chain is again challenging due to the high variations in lead times, 
demands, and demand locations (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006).  
 
The information systems of the commercial supply chain are generally well-defined and are 
using advanced technology. The information of the humanitarian relief chain is often 
unreliable, incomplete or non-existent. The work is mainly based on manual processes, trivial 
software such as Microsoft Excel and key people experience (Maon et al, 2009). 
 
The commercial strategic goals are to produce high quality products at low cost to maximize 
profitability and achieve high customer satisfaction. The strategic goals of the humanitarian 
supply chain are to minimize the loss of lives and alleviate suffering (Beamon and Balcik, 
2008, Thomas, 2003).  
 
The commercial performance measurement systems are traditionally focused on the resource 
performance measures, such as maximizing profit or minimizing costs. The humanitarian 
primary focus is on the output performance measures, such as the time required to respond to 
a disaster (Beamon and Balcik, 2008, Thomas, 2003) or the ability to meet the needs after a 
disaster (customer satisfaction). The challenges are the immeasurability of the missions and 
unknowable outcomes.  
 
The final difference is that demand in commercial supply chains is the product and in 
humanitarian relief chain the demand is first aid material, food, equipment, and rescue 
personnel (Kovacs and Spens, 2007).  
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2.3 Risk management in business logistics 
 
Fone and Young (2002) see risk management as a general management function that seeks to 
assess and address risks in the context of the overall aims of the organisation. This section 
will discuss risk management in commercial supply chains, the supply chain risk 
management. The supply chain risk management can identify the potential sources of risk and 
implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain commercial supply chain vulnerability 
(Beamon, 2004). This study aims to use supply chain risk management to identify the 
potential sources of risk on humanitarian supply chains and come to strategies to mitigate 
risks. 
 
Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) wrote an article with a good framework for 
systematically exploring the concept of risk management in supply chains. It describes the 
basic constructs of the supply chain risk management with three risk sources, risk 
consequences, five risk drivers, and four strategies to mitigate risks for supply chains. From 
this structure, the terms supply chain vulnerability and supply chain risk management can be 
derived: “Supply chain vulnerability is the propensity of risk sources and risk drivers to 
outweigh risk mitigating strategies, thus causing adverse supply chain consequences” 
(Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003). Supply chain risk management aims to identify the 
potential sources of risk and implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain supply chain 
vulnerability. 
 
Risk sources are environmental, organisational or supply chain-related variables which cannot 
be predicted with certainty and which have impact on the supply chain outcome variables. 
Environmental risk sources comprise any uncertainties arising from the supply chain-
environment interaction. These may be the result of accidents (e.g. fire), socio-political 
actions (e.g. fuel protests or terrorist attacks) or natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes or 
earthquakes). Organisational risk sources lie within the boundaries of the supply chain parties 
and range from labour (e.g. strikes) or production uncertainties (e.g. machine failure) to IT-
system uncertainties. Supply chain-related risk sources arise from interactions between 
organisations within the supply chain. Whatever damage is caused by suboptimal interaction 
between the organisations along the chain is attributable to supply chain-related risk sources.  
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Risk consequences are the supply chain outcome variables like e.g. costs or quality, i.e. the 
different forms in which the variance becomes manifest. The adverse risk consequences can 
become manifest in any outcome measure, ranging from financial consequences through 
reputation damage to health and safety concerns. 
 
Strategic choices have certain risk implications. Competitive pressures are often the drivers of 
risk and companies take ‘calculated risks’ in order to improve competitiveness, reduce costs, 
and increase or maintain profitability, which can expose the companies to more risks. In the 
last decade, there have been several factors which have increased the level of risk. These risk 
drivers include (1) a focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness; (2) the globalisation of 
supply chains; (3) focussed factories and centralised distribution; (4) the trend to outsourcing 
and (5) the reduction of the supplier base. All these risk drivers changes the structure of 
modern supply chains and impact directly on supply chain-related risk sources. Through the 
trends of outsourcing and globalisation, the complexity of supply chain structures increases. A 
supply network brings risks from all related network sources, namely uncertainties. 
Globalisation, centralised factories and centralised distribution cause longer paths resulting in 
more opportunities for disruption and a small margin for error if a disruption takes place 
(Kleindorfer and Van Wassenhove, 2004). Some of the risk drivers, like the reduction of the 
supplier base and the trend towards efficiency rather than effectiveness, lead to more 
integrated supply chains. This increases the likelihood of disruptions caused by suboptimal 
interaction between the supply chain organisations primarily through lack of ownership in 
highly integrated supply chain processes. 
 
To mitigate risks for business supply chains, Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) propose 
four strategies:  
 
- Avoidance 
- Control 
- Cooperation 
- Flexibility 
 
Avoidance occurs when risks associated with operating in a given product market or 
geographical area are considered to be unacceptable. A company could drop specific 
products, suppliers, or geographical markets if supply is seen to be unreliable. 
 16 
 
Companies may seek to control contingencies from the various risk sources, rather than 
passively treat uncertainties as constraints within which they must operate. Examples in 
supply chains include vertical integration and the use of buffer inventory or maintaining 
excess capacity in production, storage, handling and/or transport or finally, imposing 
contractual requirements on suppliers. 
 
Compared with control initiatives, cooperative responses involve joint agreements, rather than 
unilateral control, as a means of achieving uncertainty reduction. From a supply chain 
perspective, the focus on joint agreements among organisations in the supply chain is to 
improve supply chain visibility and understanding, to share information on exposures to 
specific risk sources and finally, to prepare joint business continuity plans. 
 
Flexibility increases responsiveness while leaving the predictability of factors unchanged, 
unlike the strategy ‘control’, which attempt to increase the predictability of contingencies 
from the various risk sources. One supply chain example is postponement, where companies 
delay the decision to make, configure, label or ship a product to a particular destination. 
Postponement reduces their dependence on forecasts and increases the ability to respond to 
variability or even disruptions in demand. A second supply chain example is multiple 
sourcing, which is the traditional form of managing risk through spreading risk. Finally, a 
third supply chain example is localised sourcing with its short lead-times and potential for 
quick responses. 
 
 
2.4 Risk management in humanitarian relief operations 
 
To gain a good insight in the risk management in the humanitarian relief chains, the 
framework of Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) is used. Although the framework 
described the basic constructs for commercial supply chains, the risk sources, the risk 
consequences, the risk drivers, and the four strategies have parallels with the humanitarian 
supply chains. This section will describe the basic constructs which were found in the 
literature relating to the humanitarian relief operations. The parallels which are found in the 
literature are shown in figure 3. The risk sources, risk consequences, risk drivers and 
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strategies for the regional humanitarian relief organisations will be further examined in the 
case studies. 
 
The risks sources identified above are also applicable to humanitarian supply chains. The 
natural disaster, which starts the humanitarian supply chain, is the environmental risk source. 
This environmental risk source can create complex operating conditions, which will have 
direct influence on the humanitarian supply chain (Van Wassenhove, 2006). The 
organisational risk sources are also applicable to humanitarian supply chains, because the 
natural disaster will strike on the local community. The risk source can affect labour, the 
communication, and the transportation (Sheu, 2006). Supply chain-related risk sources are 
also present in the humanitarian supply chain. After a disaster, there can be as many as several 
hundred humanitarian organisations at the scene of a disaster. These organisations have 
different agendas, ideologies and religious beliefs, but will have to work together (Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). A supply chain has to be established and supplies move to the region 
(Maon, 2009). The interactions between the organisations in the humanitarian supply chains 
are a supply chain-related risk source. 
 
The risk consequences in the humanitarian supply chains are different from the commercial 
supply chains. In terms of end-result strived for, business logistics aims at increasing profits 
whereas humanitarian supply chains aims at reducing the suffering of vulnerable people 
(Kovacs and Spens, 2007). Therefore, the adverse risk consequences for the humanitarian 
supply chains will be different and can even mean the loss of lives (Beamon, 2004).  
  
The five risk drivers have increased the level of risk in the last decade for the commercial 
supply chains (Juttner, Peck and Christopher, 2003). The humanitarian organisations are 
about 15 years behind their private sector counterparts (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Therefore 
some risk drivers are not applicable for the humanitarian relief operations. The shift of focus 
on efficiency rather than effectiveness is partly visible in the humanitarian relief chain. The 
pressure from donors asks for greater accountability and more attention is given to efficiency 
(Beamon, 2004; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon and Balcik, 2008), but the main goal 
remains the mission effectiveness (Beamon and Balcik, 2008). The humanitarian supply 
chains have a trend of globalisation and centralisation of most distribution (Van Wassenhove, 
2006). There is a trend in outsourcing in the humanitarian relief chains. In the famine in 
Ethiopia in 2000, 89% of relief organisations outsourced their trucking activities (Coe, Roe 
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and Challacombe, 2004). Reduction of supplier base is not mentioned in appropriate literature 
about humanitarian relief operations. Balcik and Beamon (2008) state the contrary, the 
humanitarian organisations should have more suppliers and not depend only on local sources, 
but also have global sources. 
 
The four strategies to mitigate risks are only partly applicable for the humanitarian relief 
operations. The first strategy of avoidance is partly usable. Avoidance of geographical 
markets and specific products are no option for humanitarian relief operations, because 
natural disasters can develop everywhere and avoiding food or medicine is no option. 
Avoidance of suppliers due to their risks to the supply chain is possible. If suppliers add more 
risk to the supply chain due to their e.g. lead time or geographical location, avoidance of these 
suppliers should be considered. For example, suppliers with a long lead time can delay a 
supply chain. Some prominent disaster relief agencies have made significant progress with 
this avoidance strategy and they have developed local sources (Maon et al, 2009).  
 
The second strategy of control can be used within humanitarian supply chains. The strategy of 
increased stockpiling and the use of buffer inventory can be used with pre-positioned 
inventory (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006). Only a few relief organizations can support the 
expense of operating international distribution centres. The majority of the non governmental 
organizations avoid the use of stockpiles considering them to be complicated and expensive 
(Balcik and Beamon, 2008). Maintaining excess capacity in storage, handling and/or transport 
can be used to remain flexible for demands. Most humanitarian organisations use pre-
established contracts with suppliers to ensure supplies after a disaster (Fritz Institute, 2005).  
 
The third strategy of cooperation can be used in humanitarian supply chains. This could be 
achieved by collaborating with other key players such as governments, military, business and 
other humanitarian organisations (Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
 
The last strategy of flexibility can be achieved in humanitarian supply chains. Applying 
postponement may prove a cost-effective measure, enabling assignment of relief supplies to 
be as rapid as appropriate (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006). Multiple sourcing is already widely 
used in the humanitarian supply chain (Sheu, 2007). The risks can be spread. With localised 
sourcing the humanitarian supply chain can response quickly (Van Wassenhove, 2006), but 
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relief agencies procuring locally must develop contingencies for acquiring supplies from other 
(non-local) sources (Balcik and Beamon, 2008). 
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 Business logistics Humanitarian relief operations 
Risk sources Environmental  Natural disasters create complex 
operating conditions 
 Organisational  Natural disasters affect labour, 
communication, and transportation 
 Supply-chain related Interaction between many different 
humanitarian organisations 
Risk 
consequences 
Financial consequences Risk of losing lives 
Risk drivers Focus on efficiency rather than 
effectiveness 
More attention to efficiency and 
accountability 
 Globalisation of supply chains Globalisation of humanitarian supply 
chains 
 Focussed factories and 
centralised distribution 
Centralisation of most distribution 
 Trend of outsourcing Outsourcing of transportation 
 
 Reduction of supplier base Not mentioned in literature 
 
Strategies Avoidance  • Avoidance of suppliers due to risk 
 
 Control • Prepositioning inventory  
• Excess capacity in storage, 
handling and/or transport 
• Contracts with suppliers 
• Warning tools 
 Cooperation • Collaboration of key players in the 
humanitarian operations 
 Flexibility • Postponement 
• Multiple sourcing 
• Localised sourcing 
Figure 3: Risk management in humanitarian supply chains  
 
Oloruntoba (2005) writes an article about the lessons of the 2004 Tsunami in the Indian 
Ocean. This study suggests the use of a good tool which warns for catastrophes. This is based 
on the key issues leading to the catastrophe in the Indian Ocean: the failure of the Pacific 
tsunami early-warning system and other geophysical and hydro-meteorological monitoring 
agencies to communicate the occurrence of a submarine earthquake and subsequent risk of a 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean to regional authorities. Although the tsunami early-warning 
system is applicable for one region, the warning system is also transferable to other regions. 
Tokyo and San Francisco are examples of cities that need to carefully prepare for the 
possibilities of earthquakes, other cities and regions are close to an active volcano and in the 
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Caribbean they need to be prepared for hurricanes (Kovacs and Spens, 2007). With an early 
warning system the humanitarian organisations can get more control. So warning tools can be 
part of the control strategy.  
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3. Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This research is based on a literature review and on gathering primary field data in case 
studies. This is a suitable research strategy since the existing literature has not yet explored 
the possible parallels between risk management and the preparation phase of humanitarian 
relief operations from the regional perspective (figure 4). The case studies will be qualitative 
and provide an in-depth perspective. The research in this study is based on two case studies, 
each of which uses a combination of expert-interviews and written material. The experts of 
both organisations have been interviewed by phone and face-to-face in 2 rounds. Each 
individual interview lasted about 10 minutes. After the first contact, semi-open questions have 
been sent to the experts. The answers were discussed with the experts in a second interview 
which was mainly carried out by telephone. In some instances, a personal meeting in the 
Caribbean was organised.  The interviews in the second round lasted approximately 30 
minutes. For the NA&A-case, the Head of Operations CZMCARIB, Staff officer Operations, 
Head of Logistics, Supply Coordinator, Transport Coordinator, Communication Coordinator 
and custodian of the local operation order (Moer, 2009) were interviewed (respectively 1A, B, 
C, D, E, F in appendix). For the CDEMA-case, the Deputy Coordinator, Chief Researcher, 
Technical Manager Preparedness and Country Support and the Information, Communication 
and Technical Specialist were interviewed (respectively 2A, B, C, D in appendix). 
This procedure ensured the provision of an in-depth perspective on the organizations and their 
behaviour during humanitarian relief operations. 
 
 
 23 
Literature review on 
similarities and 
differences between 
commercial and 
humanitarian relief 
chains
Literature review 
on risk 
management in 
business logistics
Literature review on risks 
in humanitarian relief 
operations
Case studies and expert 
interviews on the preparation of 
the NA&A and the CDERA and 
compare literature to practice
Draw parallels for the regional 
actors during the preparation 
phase to risk management and 
come with implications
 
Figure 4: The research steps 
 
3.2 Case studies 
 
Every year from May till late October, the hurricane season is torturing the Caribbean. Many 
hurricanes have created several natural disasters on the Caribbean Islands. Next to the global 
organisations, which can help in the area, there are several regional humanitarian 
organisations which come to action after a natural disaster. Throughout the years the working 
of these organisations has been tested by several natural disasters. The case-studies analyse 
the approach of two regional humanitarian organisations in the Caribbean, the humanitarian 
organisation of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
Management Agency (CDEMA). 
 
3.2.1 Case description Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 
 
The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (NA&A) are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In 
the NA&A are six islands. Regularly devastating hurricanes pass some of these islands: the 
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SSS-islands consisting of St Maarten, St Eustatius and Saba. The local commander of the 
affected island is in charge of the local hurricane relief. He is head of the Island Disaster Staff. 
The Island Disaster Staff coordinates the hurricane relief. The hurricane relief is supported by 
the Dutch Military. This support is one of the main tasks of the Dutch Military. The 
employment of the Dutch Military is coordinated by the staff of the Dutch Naval Commander 
Caribbean, who is seated in Willemstad, Curacao. For this hurricane relief, a specific 
organisation has been formed and consists of the next elements: 
 
- The Dutch Naval Commander Caribbean and his staff 
- The detachment ‘Bovenwinden’ consisting of military troops  
- A navy ship with a embarked helicopter 
- A support ship with 6 small boats 
- A detachment of the Netherlands Military Police 
- The Coastguard Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, consisting of airplanes, coastguard 
vessels, and small boats 
 
The hurricane relief consist of the rescue and helping of the affected people, organising the 
local infrastructure, organising food, (fresh) water, and basic shelter, sanitary and power 
supply.  Another task is to avoid and stop plundering. An active roll is played by the military 
in cooperation with the local authorities (fire department and police). International 
organisations as the Red Cross are also involved with the relief activities. 
 
 
3.2.2 Case description CDEMA 
 
The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency is a regional inter-governmental 
agency which serves the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and is responsible for disaster 
relief management. There are currently sixteen participating states within CDEMA’s 
membership. The main function of CDEMA is to make an immediate and coordinated 
response to any disastrous event affecting any participating state, once the state requests such 
assistance (CDEMA, 1991). The disasters can range from earthquakes, floods to hurricanes. 
 
The Agreement which established CDEMA (CDEMA, 1991) states the organs and the 
structure of CDEMA. The 16 participating states are grouped into four sub-regions, each of 
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which is headed by an operation unit known as a Sub-Regional Focal Point. The functions of 
each focal point are to maintain an updated information package about the facilities and 
services available in each participating state, maintain and test the basis communications, 
maintain independent fuel and power supplies, and maintain a serviceable and optimal 
working equipment package containing essential items. 
 
Each participating state has a National Disaster Organization or a national relief organization 
capable of responding to disasters in the all Participating States. This is the government-
designated organization which has overall responsibility for the country’s National Disaster 
Management Programme.  
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4. Results 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this section the results of the case-studies will be described. The results are based on the 
basic constructs of risk management as identified in chapter two. First, the humanitarian 
organisation of the Netherlands Antilles & Aruba will be discussed. Second, CDEMA will be 
described. An overview of the results of both case studies is shown in appendix. 
 
 
4.2 Netherlands Antilles & Aruba 
 
Risk sources are the environmental, organisational or supply-chain related variables which 
cannot be predicted with certainty and which have impact on supply chain outcome variables. 
The management of the humanitarian organisation of the NA&A sees the natural disaster 
itself as the main source of environmental risk. The natural disaster can lead to complex 
operating conditions. After hurricane Luis (1995) there was no communication with the 
affected area for the first few days after the disaster, because all communication infrastructure 
was destroyed. Another risk source after this hurricane was plundering. Plunderers robbed the 
shops and caused anarchy on the islands. Due to the plundering, food was not distributed 
equally over the population. To prevent this, a part of the humanitarian organisation, which is 
partly military, needs to be deployed to guard the shops and cannot be deployed for 
humanitarian aid. Also the transportation on the islands is a risk source after a hurricane, due 
to the bad conditions of roads and collapsed infrastructure. The risk of plundering as well as 
bad infrastructure can be considered as organisational risks.  
 
There are also supply-chain related risk sources. After each disaster, a relief chain is newly 
formed. Although there is a yearly exercise drill on the islands, after a disaster the situation is 
always different from what has been rehearsed in the exercise drill. For example, directly after 
the hurricane Luis in 1995, international humanitarian organisations flew in supplies to St 
Maarten. The regional organisation was unaware of the arrival of these supplies and had to 
come with a new plan to set up a supply chain for the distribution of these supplies.  
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The consequences of these risks can be very diverse. It can range from anarchy, in case of 
plundering, but it can also involve health risks for the local community. For example, after 
hurricane Luis in 1995, bad communication and a chaotic relief operation resulted in 
plundering and an excess of transportation of equipment and supplies. The first few days after 
the hurricane, there was no communication with the disaster area. Due to this and the chaotic 
operation, an overload of equipment and supplies were unnecessary flown to the disaster area 
and had to be shipped back after the relief operation.  
 
All the risk drivers that were identified in chapter 2 are not found in the humanitarian relief 
organisation in the NA&A. Although the organisation is also focussed on efficiency, the main 
focus of the organisation is on effectiveness. The trend of globalisation which is a risk driver 
in business logistics is not found in the organisation in the NA&A. Although the organisation 
still has some global suppliers, these suppliers are not critical for the supply chain. The 
organisation is currently reducing these global suppliers and switching more to local 
suppliers. Also the centralisation of the distribution is not found in the NA&A. The 
organisation uses several distribution centres on the main islands. The transportation of the 
organisation is not outsourced. They are supported by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 
which has his large transport capacity which can be used for humanitarian relief. This 
capacity consists of several ships, planes, helicopters and small boats (Moer, 2009). There are 
also no other activities outsourced. The main supplier of the humanitarian organisation 
NA&A is the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. They supply for example food, tents, and 
medicines. The other suppliers supply water and local goods. A reduction of the supplier base 
is not found in the organisation. 
 
The strategy of avoidance which is used by the humanitarian organisation NA&A is mainly 
based on the lead times. The lead time of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence is short 
because of their large storage of several equipment and food. Due to the Head of Logsitics, 
the supply of water by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence is avoided due to the weight and 
volume of the freshwater. The air transport capacity is not suitable for the transportation of 
the freshwater. The freshwater is now supplied by a local supplier, which has a short lead 
time. Next to this supplier, a navy ship can create and supply approximately 3000 litres of 
fresh water per day (Moer, 2009) and there is a small amount of fresh water stored in 
Curacao.  
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The organisation has several tools to gain more control of the humanitarian supply chain. The 
organisation is gaining control by pre-positioning small amounts of food, supplies and 
transportation which are geographical separated over the islands. There is also food and 
supplies stored on several navy ships which are stationed in the Caribbean. The storage on the 
islands and the navy ships has excess capacity. For the handling are several military platoons 
available. If there is a warning before a disaster strikes, a military unit, consisting of 92 
persons (Moer, 2009), is already transported to the areas which are endangered by the 
disaster. These military forces will bring their own communication equipment, to remain in 
contact with the headquarters at Willemstad. The 200 coastguard personnel and military 
forces which are based on the NA&A can all be employed for the humanitarian operation. 
They are the excess capacity of the handling. The coastguard has his own transport capacity 
which consists of two aircrafts, one helicopter, three patrol ships, and one cargo ship. These 
can be used to get supplies to the affected areas. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence have 
excess capacity of air transport in the Netherlands, which will be used before and after the 
disaster strikes. The navy ships can also be used as transport capacity to get supplies to all the 
islands. One navy ship is also accompanied by a helicopter which can be used for the ‘last 
mile’ transportation. On several islands of the NA&A, there are several trucks which can also 
be used for the ‘last mile’ transportation.  
 
The humanitarian organisation has also contracts with several suppliers. A local freshwater 
supplier can deliver large amounts of freshwater within hours at the airport or at the harbour, 
from where it can be transported to the affected areas. On the island St Maarten, the 
humanitarian organisation has a contract with a car rental company, which will deliver four-
wheel drives for transporting personnel and small amounts of food and supplies. Based on the 
limited air capacity of the coastguard, there are contracts with local air transportation 
companies which will deliver several aircrafts for the transportation of supplies and personnel 
to the affected areas. On the command centre of the humanitarian organisation in Willemstad, 
there is daily communication with several meteorological stations. This keeps the organisation 
up-to-date with the local weather forecast and especially with the hurricane threat in the 
region. If possible, they can give an early warning for possible natural disasters. 
 
Cooperation is widely used in the humanitarian operations. The humanitarian organisation is a 
cooperation of several players as described in chapter 3. The organisation works together with 
several key players to gain an efficient relief chain. The main key players are the local police, 
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fire-department, militias and the Red Cross which is based on the island St Maarten. There is 
no cooperation with other regional humanitarian organisations like CDEMA. The organisation 
believes that they can cope with all kinds of disasters. Further cooperation with other regional 
humanitarian organisations is not believed to be necessary, especially due to the close 
cooperation with the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, which gives the organisation enough 
redundancy. 
 
The humanitarian organisation uses the strategy of flexibility with several factors. The 
organisation uses postponement. They postpone the decision to ship supplies to the affected 
area. The supplies are not pushed into the affected area, but are only transported to the 
affected area after the need of these supplies is confirmed. The military forces, which are 
already geographical separated in the affected areas, have their own military communication 
equipment and not rely on the local communication infrastructure. They will communicate the 
local requirements with the command centre. Based on this information, the required supplies 
will be transported to the areas. In the past, the supplies were pushed in the affected areas. 
This leaded to chaos on the affected areas and the organisation postpones the decision to ship 
supplies and now mainly uses the ‘pull’ strategy, where military forces in the affected area 
communicate the demand for supplies and equipment with the humanitarian relief 
organisation. The organisation uses multiple sourcing, but this is mainly indirect. The 
Netherlands Ministry of Defence is the main supplier for the humanitarian organisation. They 
use multiple sourcing and they can use supplies from all NATO-countries.  
As stated before, the humanitarian organisation also uses localised sourcing for the freshwater 
supplies. Because the humanitarian organisation is controlled by the coastguard and the 
Ministry of Defence, the organisation has the power to seize supplies of the local retailers and 
companies. The seizure can be seen as a form of localised sourcing.  
 
 
4.3 CDEMA 
 
The management of CDEMA considers the natural disaster as the main risk source for the 
organisation. This environmental risk source will create complex operating conditions on the 
affected island. The natural disaster can also affect labour, communication and transportation 
on the affected island. Due to the geographical separation of the participating states, it is 
unlikely that all 16 states will be affected. Due to this, a part of the capacity of the CDEMA 
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will remain unaffected. The risk of not enough labour, bad communication and inadequate 
transportation is considered the organisational risk source. After a disaster, the government of 
the affected participating state can ask CDEMA for assistance. They will start with 
coordinating assistance from the other participating states and start a humanitarian supply 
chain. They will also appeal international organisations and other countries to assist the 
organisation. Due to the extent of the disaster, the situation after a disaster will always be 
different. The new supply chain has to adapt to the situation. The creating of the new supply 
chain can cause problems, which are considered as the supply-chain related risk source. 
 
The risk consequences can range from health risks to risk of life. After hurricane Ivan in 
2004, several health institutions remained inoperable for many days, because the institutions 
were inaccessible due to damage to the infrastructure or due to the lack of the right 
equipment. Many people suffered longer due to the inoperable institutions. 
 
Most of the risk drivers were, like in the NA&A-case, not found in the CDEMA. CDEMA is 
also mainly focussed on effectiveness, although they also try to focus on efficiency. Every 
participating state has a national disaster organisation. All these organisations have their own 
distribution centre and there is no trend of centralisation. No activities of CDEMA are 
outsourced. The participating states use their own transportation of all personnel, equipment 
and supplies, but after a disaster all transportation is coordinated by CDEMA. There is also no 
trend of reduction of the supplier base. CDEMA is expanding their supplier base to remain 
resilient.  
 
There is a trend of globalisation within the organisation. Most supplies come from national 
and regional organisations, but international organisations, like NGOs, can provide specific 
resources or expertise. CDEMA already cooperate with NGOs and after a disaster CDEMA 
coordinates this assistance.  
 
All participating states have their suppliers and have their own avoidance strategy. Suppliers 
are avoided based on their lead times and geographical setting.  
 
CDEMA uses the strategy of control. All 16 states have their own national organizations, 
which have their own suppliers, pre-positioned inventory, and own capacity in storage, 
handling and transportation. This creates an overlap which ensures the right aid for the 
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community. The four Sub-Regional Focal Points have a database of relevant resources, 
facilities, and services of their sub-region and this gives the organization good control of the 
supply chain. All participating states have their own contracts with suppliers. Most states have 
contracts with local suppliers which oblige them to have excess supplies during the hurricane 
season in their own warehouses, to make sure that enough supplies can be delivered after a 
disaster. CDEMA established arrangements with regional airlines and shipping lines in order 
to ensure access to their facilities on a priority basis after a disaster. The secretariat of 
CDEMA, which is based in Barbados, monitors the Caribbean meteorological stations which 
will warn the organization and participating states for coming disasters.  
 
CDEMA has pursued a policy of cooperation with national, regional and international 
organisations which have overlapping interest. They cooperate with all sixteen national 
disaster organisations, NGOs like the Red Cross, private sector and specialised technical 
agencies. After a disaster the organisation makes an appeal to all organisations to assist in the 
humanitarian relief organisation. 
 
The fourth strategy of flexibility is also used in the organisation. Postponement is frequently 
used. One of the best lessons from other humanitarian relief operations is the need of an 
immediate assessment of the affected area. This assessment has to be made within 12-24 
hours after the disaster. Due to much effort, the organisation has now a reliable damage 
assessment system and procedures to facilitate rapid and effective evaluation of a disaster. An 
emergency operations system capable of handling emergency telecommunications and 
facilitating coordination of emergency responses are rapidly established. This emergency 
system relies on HF-radio and satellite communication, because the primary communication 
with telephone and internet is probably out of commission. The immediate assessment enables 
the organisation to postpone the decision to transport supplies to the affected area until there 
is a reliable assessment of the need for supplies in the area. To remain flexible, all 
organisations which assist in the humanitarian relief operation have to coordinate the correct 
supplies and the transportation with CDEMA. In the past, organisations helped the affected 
areas with supplies, but these uncoordinated supplies had to be processed and a new supply 
chain had to be formed. This uncoordinated assistance delayed the operation and consumed 
capacity of the organisation. 
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CDEMA uses localised sourcing within the organization. All sixteen states have their own 
sources, which are mainly local. Due to the limited resources in the region, some suppliers are 
from outside of the region. All participating states have their own regional and/or national 
suppliers for their inventory. CDEMA is also maintaining relations with international relief 
organisations, like the Red Cross, in order to facilitate accessing of their resources. With these 
overlapping resources, CDEMA use multiple sourcing. 
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5. Discussion 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 2, the literature describing the humanitarian operations and risk management has 
been discussed. This study is focussing on the regional humanitarian operations and where 
risk management can assist the regional humanitarian organisations. Therefore, the case-
studies focus on whether and how the regional humanitarian organisations can use risk 
management in their preparation phase. Based on the constructs of the risk management, the 
results from the case-studies will be discussed and compared with the literature about 
humanitarian operations and risk management.  
 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
The risk sources, which are described in the literature, have parallels with the regional 
humanitarian organisations from the case studies. The environmental risk source is a large 
risk, because the natural disaster creates complex operating conditions. The organisational 
risk source in humanitarian relief operations is similar to the situation as described in the 
literature about commercial supply chains. The risk source is present in both organisations, 
because a disaster can affect labour, communications, and transportation. In the NA&A is also 
the risk of plundering, which will lead to anarchy on the islands. Although the regional 
organisations hold regular exercise drills, each relief chain is newly formed after a disaster 
and the interaction between the different humanitarian organisations remains a supply chain-
related risk source. 
 
The risk consequences of the regional humanitarian organisations are similar for all 
humanitarian organisations and without adequate and timely delivery of supplies, the risk can 
have consequences for health and lives. An extra risk consequence is the plundering on the 
NA&A. This leads to anarchy, which will affect the transportation of the last mile on the 
affected island. The anarchy can delay the humanitarian supply chain.  
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Most of the risk drivers from the business logistics are also found in the humanitarian 
literature. However, when we look at the case study material, only the globalisation trend was 
identified by the regional organisations. No other risk drivers were identified by the regional 
organisations. Maybe the evolvement of the regional humanitarian organisations are years 
behind the large international organisations or the risk drivers are absent because this is 
inherent to these organisations. The shift of focus on efficiency rather than effectiveness, 
which is seen at the business logistics and with international NGO’s, did not occur within the 
regional organisations. The main reason is probably because the regional organisation is run 
by the government, which has no pressure from donors. There is some globalisation found in 
the organisation of NA&A, but there is no trend of more globalisation. The organisation 
searches for more regional players in the supply chain. The trend within this organisation is to 
reduce the globalisation. A trend of more globalisation is found within CDEMA. They 
cooperate with NGOs and after a disaster, NGOs can deliver specific supplies to the affected 
states. This cooperation with these international humanitarian organisations is established as 
an extent of the national and regional supply network and is mainly used for multiple sourcing 
and establishing a resilient supply chain. These international suppliers can not be considered 
as a replacement and therefore this globalisation can not be seen as a risk driver as mentioned 
in chapter 2. The trend of centralisation, outsourcing, and reduction of suppliers are not found 
in the regional organisations, probably because the regional organisations are years behind the 
international organisations. 
 
The strategy of avoidance is used in the regional organisations. Most suppliers are chosen 
based on their geographical position and lead time and other suppliers are avoided. Avoiding 
certain markets or products is not possible for humanitarian organisations based on their main 
goal. Their main goal is to reduce the suffering of the community. Avoiding in these 
organisations will result in avoiding people in need or withhold them certain required 
products. 
 
The regional humanitarian organisations both use the strategy control as described in the 
literature about humanitarian organisations. They preposition their inventory and spread these 
inventories strategically over their operating areas. Both have especially non-consumable 
inventories and trust on supplies from out of their operating areas. Both had excess capacity in 
storage, handling and/or transport. One had this due to their high level of collaboration and 
the other based on their military back-up. They both had contracts with suppliers which 
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provide consumable, non-consumable supplies and services. The warning tools are very good 
in the Caribbean and both organisations rely on warning tools outside their own organisation. 
The warning tools are checked regularly and will provide the organisations with an early 
warning if possible. 
 
The cooperation of the regional actors is mostly on a high level. The NA&A do not cooperate 
with other regional humanitarian organisations and rely on their collaboration with the Red 
Cross, regional police, militias and their backup from the Netherlands Military. Especially the 
Netherlands Military is a large player. Although the military assistance to the humanitarian 
organisation is mainly based on the assets and personnel which are based in the Caribbean, 
the military assistance can be enlarged with management, material and personnel which are 
based in the Netherlands. The CDEMA does cooperate with their 16 members and national, 
regional and international organisations.  
 
The regional actors already use the strategy of flexibility. Both organisations already use 
postponement in combination with some critical pre-positioned inventories. They both rely on 
their communications and only send supplies to the affected areas after these supplies are 
requested. Both organisations use a combination of localised sourcing and multiple sourcing 
to remain as flexible as possible. CDEMA consists of 16 participating countries, with all their 
own government-designated organizations. These organizations all have their own contracts 
and suppliers. Although this may not be efficient, it makes the organization resilient.   
 
The basic constructs of risk management for business logistics which are proposed by Juttner, 
Peck and Christopher (2003) were also found in the literature about humanitarian relief 
operations and the regional organisations from the case studies. Although the risk drivers 
from the business logistics were not found in the regional organisations, the framework of the 
business logistics with the basic constructs can be used in the regional humanitarian relief 
operations. Due to the limited in-depth interviews by telephone, this research does not study 
till what extent the basic constructs were implemented.  
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6. Conclusion and further research 
 
 
In this research, the objective was to examine the parallels between commercial and 
humanitarian relief chains in the preparation phase from the regional perspective and come to 
implications from supply chain risk management for the preparation for disaster relief 
operations from the regional perspective. In previous research Kovacs and Spencer (2007) 
stated that risk management can help regional organisations in the preparation phase of 
humanitarian relief operations. 
 
Although the humanitarian relief chain is different from the business supply chain in some 
ways, the framework of risk management proposed by Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003) 
for the business logistics can be transferred to humanitarian organisations including the 
regional organisations. The framework consists of four basic constructs: (1) the risk sources, 
(2) the risk consequences, (3) the risk drivers, and (4) the strategies to mitigate risks. The 
regional humanitarian organisations, which were studied during this research, do have the 
same risk sources. The risk consequences are different and can range up to risk of life. The 
risk drivers were mostly not found in the regional organisations, probably because the 
organisations are years behind of the global humanitarian organisations. Only the risk driver 
globalisation was found, but this was not a risk driver in the regional organisation. Due to the 
lack of these risk drivers, the supply chain is not exposed to more risks like the business 
logistics. The regional organisations already used the risk management strategies avoidance, 
cooperation, control and flexibility.  
 
The managerial implications of the study lie in the observation that although the regional 
actors which have been studied for this research already used most of the risk management 
strategies, other regional humanitarian organisations might improve their organisation to 
apply the risk management strategies from the business logistics which have been proposed 
by Juttner, Peck and Christopher (2003). With the strategies avoidance, control, cooperation, 
and flexibility, the regional actors can achieve a more effective preparation of disaster relief 
operations and gain a more resilient organisation.  
 
Several limitations of this study are noted. First, the regional actors from the case studies were 
both situated in a relatively small geographical area, which does not create a complex 
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environment. Other regional actors may have larger operating areas and a more complex 
environment. Second, the Caribbean is also known for the hurricanes which torture the region, 
which pushes the local community to remain alert. In regions which are less prone to natural 
disasters and have a more complex environment than the Caribbean, risk management might 
help the regional actors in the phase of preparing for natural disasters. Third, the case study of 
CDEMA was limited to written material and telephone interviews with 4 experts. More 
experts could have given a better insight. Fourth, the research only studied if the basic 
constructs were present within the regional organisations. It did not research to what extent 
the basic constructs were implemented in the organisations. To study this, a more in-depth 
research is required. To create a better insight in the risk management in regional 
humanitarian organisations, further research is required. Further research should study more 
regional humanitarian organisations which are more geographical separated. With a more in-
depth study of the organisations, the level of implementation of the basic constructs can better 
be explored.  
